A textbook story

On March 14, 2023, the exchange rate of the Lebanese lira with the dollar reached an all-time low: on that day, 100,000 Lebanese pounds were needed to buy a dollar. A figure not even imaginable before the protests of 2019 and the catastrophic events that have taken place in Lebanon in recent years: events that have greatly reduced the purchasing power of the Lebanese as well as the supply of raw materials.

The effects of this devaluation have been accompanied by a series of other regional and international dynamics: at the regional level, the isolation that the country experiences, surrounded by Israel and Syria, continues to weigh: two countries with uncomfortable borders that do not facilitate trade; internationally, the outbreak of war in Ukraine had a heavy impact on the supply of grain: just think not only that Lebanon is dependent on imports for most of its raw materials and manufactured products but that about 80% of imports of wheat arrived in the country from Ukraine.
The destruction of the silos during the explosion at the port of Beirut on August 4, 2020 literally pulverized the grain stocks, stocks that were never replenished.

This general situation which links marked political uncertainty (since 31 October 2022 Lebanon has been without the President of the Republic) to a lack of resources, has serious repercussions on the population and its daily survival. It is a transversal crisis that affects large sections of the population regardless of community membership. This data is certainly interesting if we consider that, historically, the poorest strata of the Lebanese population were mainly to be found within the Shiite community and, in part, Sunni. Today's situation has had a 360-degree impact, also affecting the middle class, especially represented by members of the Maronite and Sunni communities, which has seen its purchasing power almost reduced to zero and life savings liquefied.

According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of the population in Lebanon does not achieve adequate levels of social and economic security.
The poverty rate has soared so much that for more than half of the population food security is at risk. Lebanese families find it extremely difficult to make ends meet and access to primary goods is difficult not only for those in the lowest income brackets: 26% of upper-middle income families have to give up less necessary expenses to ensure adequate meals. Due to the crisis, the few state subsidies that families received, such as those for petrol and medicines, were canceled, aggravating already highly precarious situations.

Furthermore, the support funds that come from international institutions are mainly aimed at those segments of the population who find themselves in situations of extreme poverty, leaving aside all those people who, even in a situation of need, cannot be inserted within these categories.
A similar situation also occurs at the national level as regards the welfare system: the Lebanese National Social Security Fund is designed for segments of the population with stable jobs and for the most disadvantaged strata, leaving out all those Lebanese who have precarious jobs and who move in the informal market (according to ILO estimates more than 60% of the population in 2022). The lack of assistance from the state in the form of social benefits often opens the way for support to come to families from sectarian political parties and/or from large zuama families who still play an important role in Lebanese politics and society. This translates into the strengthening of confessional and/or community ties and their use by the elite to consolidate their political and social positioning.

If, historically, the Lebanese social protection system has always penalized a universalist vision, after the end of the civil war (1975-1990) there has been an increasingly marked reduction in the role of the state. This was accompanied by a gradual rentierization of the Lebanese economy, increasingly dependent on foreign capital. This has had as a side effect an increasingly massive concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and the widening of the gap between rich and poor.

In this scenario, what has the greatest impact on families and their survival is access to food.
The lack of resources often forces families to skip some meals and the most critical situations arise in single-income families with the presence of elderly, disabled people and children. In lower-income families, the crisis situation often translates into the presence of child labor or early marriages: solutions that attempt to alleviate the burden of finding food within families. This situation leads to heavy debt for the purchase of foodstuffs which traps families in usury mechanisms.

According to the projections of the index that monitors the situation of food insecurity and malnutrition in the world IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), in 2022 37% of the Lebanese and Syrian population present in the country of cedars suffered from severe and acute food insecurity. These data make Lebanon the sixth country in the world with the worst food crisis after South Sudan, Yemen, Haiti, Afghanistan and the Central African Republic.

The economic crisis that hit Lebanon has pushed three quarters of the population into a state of poverty, exacerbating the difficulties of accessing basic services such as electricity (a sector which was already severely compromised before the crisis) and health care (also due to the spread of the Covid 19 pandemic). In the last year, some cases of cholera have reappeared in Lebanon, testifying to the situation of precariousness and poverty in which large sections of the population, Lebanese and non-Lebanese, live.

The lack of a serious plan of political and economic reforms has in fact led to the freezing of the disbursement of aid allocated by international organizations which have said they are willing to support the country only against a tangible and lasting commitment. Discontent is widespread, poverty rampant, the political class evanescent, institutions absent. One crisis after another seems to touch this small Mediterranean country in an endless spiral where, at the moment, a change of course seems to be still far away.

* Rosita Di Peri
NP April 2023

* Rosita Di Peri, associate professor at the Department of Culture, Politics and Society (University of Turin), where she teaches "Politics, Institutions and Cultures of the Middle East" and "Mashrek Politics and Institutions".