In an endless crisis

October 17, 2022 marked the third anniversary of the thawra (literally revolution) which saw the Lebanese take to the streets massively to protest against bad governance, rampant corruption and cronyism. The protests opened a devastating three-year period for the country: the economic crisis, which led to the declaration of default by former Prime Minister Hassan Diab in March 2020, was intertwined with the spread of the pandemic. The explosion at the port of Beirut on 4 August of the same year was then grafted onto this picture, which caused death and destruction in a large part of the Lebanese capital and whose perpetrators have not yet been identified.
The interpenetration of these multiple crises has exacerbated the growth of social inequalities, exacerbated the already present lack of basic services (electricity, drinking water...), leading to a progressive impoverishment of the population (according to estimates around 80% of Lebanese live below the poverty line) and the country's exposure to global and regional crises.

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 2022
In a climate of general uncertainty and with an outgoing government, the legislative elections were held on 15 May 2022, a much-awaited appointment full of expectations especially in the light of the protests of 2019 during which the Lebanese clamored for the replacement of the political class. Yet, despite the strong commitment to change, the preparation of electoral lists far from the traditional political parties and the large zuamas that govern Lebanese society, the election results have once again confirmed the old balances and alliances. The forces of change, which overall managed to obtain 13 seats in Parliament (out of 128), are not able by themselves to impose a decisive change of course on a system characterized by profound corruption and still widespread. However, although the results achieved may appear to be anything but satisfactory, even the prospect of being able to block the legislative process with one's vote appears to be a small victory. What appears from the outside, however, is a further fragmentation of Parliament and the prospect of a blockage or slowdown of its functions.
The elections, therefore, did not upset the Lebanese political landscape as the protesters hoped. The 13 seats won by the forces of change, the victory of complete strangers in some electoral districts that seemed impregnable, the defeat of some "familiar faces", are all encouraging signs and, for sure, these results would not have been achieved without the commitment constant in the protests that started in 2019. However, after the electoral fever, the country remains in an increasingly precarious situation in which it is difficult to deal with emergencies.
Nor does the Lebanese political class seem to be aware of the need to launch a road map for reforms as requested by many. Even the possibility that lies on the horizon of being able to exploit the gas fields present in the Mediterranean Sea in front of the coasts of the country, not only would it not produce its fruits in the short term, requiring technology that Lebanon does not possess and which should attract from abroad but, at the same time, it would not lead to effective results without serious reforms. Indeed, without a serious renewal program, the inflow of dollars from gas production would risk increasing the pre-existing clientele networks.

WHAT PROSPECTS?
In such a situation, the socio-political evolution of the country seems to depend on the performance of two elements. The first obviously concerns the economic crisis; the second is linked to the role of Hezbollah. As regards the first aspect, it must be reiterated that, although the crisis of the Lebanese economic and financial system was partly determined by the gradual rentierisation of the economy (Lebanon is now a country almost completely devoid of an autonomous production system and must import the almost all of primary goods), the roots of this system are to be found in the laissez-faire which has always been the matrix of the Lebanese economy.
This structure was strengthened after the end of the civil war by inscribing itself in the trajectories of global neoliberalism which has exacerbated some aspects. In particular, the deviated Lebanese consociational model has been grafted onto this system, i.e. a system penetrated by an omnipresent corruption and by the intertwining of a society largely governed by client-patron relationships (above all in the countryside and in the villages) and by a confessionalism which places religious affiliation above the rights of citizenship. The deviated consociational model has been able, over the years, to perpetuate itself by becoming impermeable to change and increasingly exploiting the resources of the state not for the well-being of its citizens but for particular interests.
The resilience of such a system makes it difficult to foresee a change in the short to medium term without a total and structural replacement of the political class (a fact which seems highly unlikely also in the light of the recent electoral results) and, above all, of the consociational/confessional management of politics and of the company.
The second element concerns the presence of Hezbollah within this system. His strength is anchored in a process of legitimization which saw him as a protagonist after the end of the civil war (also as a bulwark of resistance against Israel) and which had its political climax in the agreement signed in 2005 with the Free Patriotic Movement by Michel Aoun (the outgoing President of the Republic), one of the main Maronite political parties present in the country. However, a series of positions taken by the party in the face of unexpected events has contributed to altering this picture. The first is linked to the 2011 protests and Hezbollah's decision to support Bashar al Assad in the repression of his people. The second is related to the 2019 protests and the party's role in them.
Initial statements in support of the demonstrators by party secretary Hassan Nasrallah were followed by intimations to withdraw from the squares accompanied, then, by the dispatch of casseurs between the tents set up in the squares of the protests to disperse the demonstrators. With these attitudes, Hezbollah seems to have demonstrated that, like the other Lebanese political forces hostile to change, they have at heart the maintenance of a functional status quo to preserve their political and economic interests. The aura of novelty and change that had characterized the work of the movement/party since its appearance on the Lebanese political scene seems to have faded heavily and, during the protests of 2019, images and flags of the party were also removed or set on fire in the south of the country, one of the areas controlled by the party.

La mancanza di lungimiranza e di una chiara strategia politica stanno portando il Paese a un punto di non ritorno. Sempre più frequenti sono gli atti esasperati di una popolazione allo stremo e, a testimonianza del deteriorarsi della situazione, stanno anche ricomparendo, in alcune zone del Paese, malattie che si pensavano debellate come il colera. A oggi, la quarta seduta del parlamento non ha ancora portato alla formazione di un nuovo governo e il 31 ottobre è scaduto anche il mandato del Presidente della Repubblica Michel Aoun. In preda alla minaccia di vuoto istituzionale il Libano si avvia verso un inverno privo di prospettive.

The lack of foresight and a clear political strategy are leading the country to a point of no return. The exasperated acts of a population on its last legs are increasingly frequent and, as evidence of the deterioration of the situation, diseases that were thought to have been eradicated, such as cholera, are also reappearing in some areas of the country. To date, the fourth session of parliament has not yet led to the formation of a new government and on 31 October the mandate of the President of the Republic Michel Aoun also expired. Prey to the threat of an institutional vacuum, Lebanon is heading towards a winter with no prospects.

Rosita DiPeri
NP December 2022

Rosita DiPeri
Associate Professor in Political Science and International Relations,
Coordinator of the Summer School 'Understanding the Middle East'
https://www.tomideast.com/,
Department of Culture, Politics and Society - University of Turin