One for all

"The historian cannot interpret current events, which require other approaches.
He can only present the events of a given era as objectively as possible, so that men and women of good will can draw the appropriate conclusions today." Thus concludes the long essay that diplomat and historian Maurizio Serra (photo) dedicated to the 1938 Munich Conference (Scacco alla pace, Neri Pozza editore 2024).
A completely understandable consideration that applies to any historical phenomenon: we cannot find certain answers in the past, but insights, paths, and possibilities for comparison.
Always keeping in mind, on the one hand, human freedom, and, on the other, the differences in historical contexts. Precedents, however, are important and can help us find important interpretative categories.

Recent developments in the Ukrainian situation, Trump's ambiguous diplomatic prominence, the uncoordinated movements of European governments, and Russia's continued aggressiveness all call to mind the Munich experience of 1938.

This comparison has been made ever since Putin's invasion, and now, with direct Russian-American negotiations, the idea that the fate of a sovereign people is decided at a table, without its involvement, appears entirely consistent with what happened between September 29 and 30, 1938. On that occasion, France, England, Italy, and Germany agreed to grant the latter the annexation of the Sudetenland, a population of German origin located in Czechoslovak territory.
All this occurred without any participation from the Prague government. The idea was to satisfy Hitler's imperialist demands by sacrificing the territorial unity of the Czechoslovaks.
In reality, after Austria and the Sudetenland, Nazi appetites continued unabated, involving Prague itself (March 1939) and, finally, Poland (September 1939). We all know how it went. In Munich, Czechoslovakia paid the price of a fleeting peace for all European countries, a sort of modern-day re-enactment of Caiaphas's statement: "You understand nothing, nor consider that it is better that one man should die for the people than that the whole nation should die" (John 11:49-50). The risk is that what happened could somehow be repeated.
To paraphrase Serra, who quoted Edvard Beneš, president of Czechoslovakia at the time, it is unfortunately likely that Ukraine is no longer the bulwark against Russian penetration but its Trojan horse.

The Munich precedent also reminds us of the moral climate prevailing in those weeks, "characterized by a sort of looming failure: that of a Europe incapable of rediscovering its identity and regenerating its energies." Nearly ninety years later, Serra warns: "We continue to live in the shadow of a syndrome of fatalism and impotence, ready to periodically reappear in strategic crises. [...] This raises the question of the attitude of democracies toward force, and of pacifism in the face of brutality." Serra's response lies in firmness, even through force, "in the ways and within the limits established by international law.
Responding to aggression with passivity can only encourage dictatorships and their disastrous ambitions." As Europeans, we—sincerely—dream and want something more: complete political unity, a true defense of democracy.

Renato Bonomo
NP December 2025