The New Syria

According to Daniele Santoro, an expert on Turkey for the magazine Limes, for more than forty years Syria has been the microcosm of Turkish geopolitics, because the evolution of bilateral relations and the modalities of Ankara’s presence beyond its borders anticipate the overall strategic trajectory of its foreign policy.

In Syria, the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa proposes a model of Islamic neoliberalism based on the privatization of state assets (ports and factories) and austerity as a dogma (especially in terms of cuts to public spending). At the same time, state assets (largely war spoils) are distributed among regime loyalists and businesspeople who supported the cause, creating yet another inseparable fusion between political, religious, and economic power. Needless to say, the social consequences will be severe: even if living conditions improve slightly compared to the catastrophic years of war, development will be inequitable and will entail a progression of low wages, poor public services, and extreme inequalities. It is difficult to imagine that under these conditions there will be a massive return of refugees. As many Turkish observers point out, Syria is applying, in its own way, Erdoğan’s AKP development model: a mix of social conservatism, nationalism, and neoliberal economic policies, which favors the creation of a narrow circle of conglomerates loyal to the president. But the 31.2% increase in Turkish exports to Syria is proof of the economic hegemony that Ankara is building in the neighboring country.

Post-war Syria, with its economy to be rebuilt, will become a natural market for Turkish goods and investments, creating a structural dependence on Ankara. The reduction of Syrian customs duties on 260 Turkish products is a very clear signal of this influence. Recently, the new Syrian leadership took part in the World Economic Forum in Davos, demonstrating that the ideology in power can be Islamist while also being perfectly compatible with the circuits of global finance. In other words, the rhetoric may be religious and anti-Western, but economic practice is integrated into global capitalism.

Turkey, with its role as a bridge and its powerful business sector, is the ideal intermediary in this process. Not only that: the Turkish initiative in Syria (and the weak Western reaction) is a symptom of the relative disengagement of the United States from the region. Turkey is trying to fill this vacuum, positioning itself as the key actor for any future “peace” or stabilization. But the “peace” that emerges from this scenario is not based on democratic values or human rights, but rather functional and authoritarian (in this sense, the Trumpian model itself sets a precedent), guaranteed by a balance of forces and by an economic model that rewards elites affiliated with power.

For the moment, however, this Turkish-Syrian model offers a form of stabilization (albeit at a low level) that halts the flow of migrants and counters other rival powers such as Iran or Russia. The cynicism of an asphyxiated international politics will probably accept this ongoing process willingly, in the name of a “stability,” however precarious, that becomes a political process of redefining the entire region. At the center of this process, we reiterate, is Erdoğan’s Turkey, which is not only influencing Syrian politics, but is exporting its model of governance and building a sphere of economic influence that could shape the Middle East of the coming decades. Meanwhile, Syria’s future appears increasingly tied to a regional order whose strategic and economic epicenter lies in Ankara.

Claudio Monge
NP November 2025